Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate: Trends and Prospects by Leo Grebler et al.
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate: Trends and
Prospects
Volume Author/Editor: Leo Grebler, David M. Blank, and Louis Winnick




Chapter Title: The Future Role of Government
Chapter Author: Leo Grebler, David M. Blank, Louis Winnick
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1334
Chapter pages in book: (p. 284 - 300)CHAPTER XVIII
THE FUTURE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
Tm net effects of market forces will probably be modified in sub-
stantial degree by government action, and no appraisal of future
prospects for capital formation in residential construction would be
complete without considering the important role of the federal govern-
ment in this field. Opportunities for the investment of private savings
in new residential real estate and the sources of funds will be greatly
influenced by the use of existing, and possibly the introduction of'new,
federal credit aids. Finally, while public housing is outside the scope
of this study and, because of its relatively small volume to date, could
be ignored in the analysis of the past record, possible interactions
between public housing, urban redevelopment, and the volume and
financing of private residential construction cannot be dismissed when
the future is considered.
Credit Aids to Private Construction
Whichever of the data presented in Chapters X and XVI are re-
viewed, it is clear that up to roughly half the market for private
residential construction and mortgage financing of new housing has
come to operate directly under federal credit aid programs. The flow
of mortgage funds into residential construction has been increasingly
influenced by the terms and other stipulations, prescribed by laws and
administrative rulings, under which the Federal Housing Administra-
tion and Veterans' Administration will accept mortgages for insurance
or guarantee. For up to half the total market the pattern of interest
rates, downpayment requirements, and amortization periods, as well as
borrowers' credit ratings and location and physical design of new
construction, has been subject to governmental as well as private
decisions. Market forces operating on the mortgage interest rate have
been modified by opening or closing the gates of the Federal National
Mortgage Association and by using this government agency occa-
sionally as a primary source of funds almost equivalent to direct
federal loans.
The scope of the government programs is such that political decisions
can influence the volume and composition of building activity in an
appreciable though as yet not fully determinable measure. This drastic
change in the channeling of funds into investment has come about in
the brief span of about twenty years and, accentuated by the exigencies
of World War II, has reached a peak during the postwar period.FUTURE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 287
The size alone of the federal programs, in both absolute and relative
terms, suggests the vast dimension of their implications. The full effect
of these operations on housing production and the flow of mortgage
funds, as well as on the economy as a whole, defies simple measure-
ment. Their share in total residential construction and mortgage lend-
ing does not take account of their far-reaching indirect influences on
building types in residential construction, land planning in new sub-
divisions, the structure of the house-building industry, the extent of
home ownership, general lending practices, sources of funds, terms of
conventional mortgages, and other facets of this complex business. Only
a few of the implications of the governmental activities are selected
for discussion here—those which have a bearing on the future course
of capital formation and financing in this field.
An appraisal of the future role of federal credit aids must concern
itself with at least three questions: (1) Does the observed increase in
scope and intensity of federal aids since 1935 suggest a trend, or is it
perhaps more adequately explained as a response to temporary pres-
sures and maladjustments in housing markets? (2) Are there limits to
the effectiveness of present means of federal assistance, and if so, what
are the alternatives? (3) If the assumption of a trend is warranted,
what consequences will arise for the volume and stability of capital
formation and financing in this field? In considering these questions,
the investigator shifts from the relatively secure ground of historical
analysis to a more treacherous field, where judgment plays a larger
role; and his only qualification at this point is perhaps the develop-
ment, through training and experience, of an attitude that should assure
judicious consideration of all relevant factors and minimize if not
prevent the injection of his own biases.
A Trend?
Each of the federal credit aids for private residential construction
had a special justification when it was established. The mortgage in-
surance program of the FHA was enacted originally to assist in eco-
nomic recovery and to improve the mortgage system. The principal
steps toward more liberal credit terms for FHA-insured loans were
taken to meet crises in war housing and to help relieve the postwar
housing shortage. The guarantee of veterans' home loans was adopted
as part of a program to ease the adjustment of ex-servicemen to
civilian life. The use of the Federal National Mortgage Association for
practically direct government lending operations was authorized as a
stop-gap solution when the supply of mortgage funds for FHA and
VA loans at fixed interest rates threatened to diminish.'
1Fora more detailed account see Miles L. Colean, The Impact of Government288 FUTURE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
One might thus be led to believe that many if not all of these opera-
tions could be withdrawn when their original purposes had been
served. However, here as in the interpretation of other events, it is
necessary to distinguish sharply between the incidents that give rise to
political actions and the more deep-seated forces that underlie the
actions.
Basically, the development of federal aids for housing, comprising
not only the activities analyzed in this study but also public housing
and assistance in urban redevelopment, must be viewed as part of a
long-term social change which vests housing conditions, and not only
those of the poor and indigent, with broad and probably intensifying
public interest. This change seems to reflect basic attitudes of the
community at large, although its intensity and therefore the pace and
form of federal programs may vary over time and in different political
and economic cimates.2 This broad concept received Congressional
recognition in the "Declaration of National Housing Policy," which
forms the preamble to the Housing Act of 1949. It is reflected in the
organizational assembly in the Housing and Home Finance Agency of
federal agencies concerned with housing and credit for housing
(except the Veterans' Administration). It was reaffirmed in the Presi-
dent's Housing Message to Congress of January 25, 1954, in these
words: "The development of conditions under which every American
family can obtain good housing is a major objective of national policy."
The use of federal credit aids as tools in a broad program to improve
housing conditions is supported by the still broader, widely accepted
social objective of maintaining reasonably full employment. It is almost
inconceivable that aids to housing production will not be incorporated
in programs to combat unemployment if and when the time for such
programs comes. In fact, existing aids will most probably be intensified
and supplemented under such conditions, or they will be extended
beyond their original expiration date. Such a contingency, for example,
may affect the termination of the home loan program for veterans of
World War II, now scheduled for 1957.
The employment of federal credit aids is supported also by a widely
held notion that the house-building "industry," however defined, is
on Real Estate Finance in the United States, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1950.
2Itis of intçrest to note in this connection that the platforms of the Democratic
and Republican Parties for 1944, 1948, and 1952 do not touch at all upon the FHA
mortgage insurance and VA home loan guarantee programs or on the operations of
the Federal National Mortgage Association. In contrast, they differ substantially
upon public housing and slum clearance and redevelopment whenever these items
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backward in comparison with other industries meeting essential con-
sumers' needs. In this view, new housing historically has been a luxury
product available only to the upper income groups, and government
action is necessary to compensate for the apparent inability of the
industry to meet the need for houses of good standards within the
reach of every family or the average family, or however the "need"
may be defined.
The "trend" suggested by these observations is strengthened by the
conviction of strategic groups that continued government aids are
indispensable to the effective operation of the processes by which new
housing is built and marketed. Critical issues during the past ten years
provide vivid illustrations. One is the termination in 1945 of the
wartime Title VI of the National Housing Act, with its "firm com-
mitments" to builders and its generous financing terms, and its re-
enactment in slightly modified form in 1946 as part of the veterans'
emergency housing program.4 Another is the liberalization in 1950 of
financing terms for rental and cooperative housing projects under
Title II of this act when Section 608, designed to encourage rental
construction under war and postwar conditions, was allowed to expire.5
A third is the increase in 1950 of the guarantee for veterans' home
loans from 50 per cent of the loan amount not exceeding $4,000 to
60 per cent not exceeding $7,500, plus an extension of the maximum
maturity from twenty-five to thirty years6—a revision that followed the
decrease in the volume of these loans in 1948 and 1949 and contributed
to the spectacular increase of housing starts in 1950. Still another
example is the Congressional action in 1951 which eased housing credit
restrictions imposed in 1950. There is further the Congressional
This viewpoint permeates much of the housing literature of the past twenty
years, government reports, and Congressional deliberations. See Toward More
Housing, U.S. Congress, Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power,
Temporary National Economic Committee Monograph 8, 76th Cong., 3rd sess.;
Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, U.S. Congress,
Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power, 76th Cong., 1st sess., Part II,
Construction Industry, 1940; Charles Abrams, The Future of Housing, Harper,
1946, Chaps. 5 and 13; Robert Lasch, Breaking the Building Blockade, University
of Chicago Press, 1946, pp. 7-10; and numerous statements at Congressional
hearings on the Taft-Ellender-Wagner bill: General Housing Act of 1945; Hearings
be fore the Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 1592, 79th Cong., 1st sass.,
and Housing: Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 287,
S. 866, S. 701, S. 801, S. 802, S. 803, and S. 804, 80th Cong., 1st sess., passim.
See also High Cost of Housing: Report of a Subcommittee on the Joint Committee
on Housing, 80th Cong., 2nd sass., H. Doc. 647, 1948, and Nathan Straus, Two
Thirds of a Nation, Knopf, 1952.
Public Law 388, Chap. 268, 79th Cong., 2nd sess.
Public Law 475, Chap. 94, 81st Cong., 2nd sess.
6Ibid.
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authorization of June 1953 (not acted upon), which permitted the
President to reduce downpayment requirements and extend maturities
for FHA loans on new homes in certain price classes when "conditions
in the home building industry and the general economy require it"—
following on the heels of builders' complaints over a jam in mortgage
lending and unsteady production.8 Finally, the recommendations of the
President's Advisory Committee on Government Housing Policies and
Programs and the proposed Housing Act of 1954 included liberaliza-
tions for FHA-insured loans to encourage a larger volume of new
residential construction.9
In all these instances consumers' and builders' and sometimes mort-
gage banking interests combined to produce demands for more potent
federal aids when a decline in the volume of building occurred or
threatened. The apparent dependence on the federal programs devel-
oped under conditions which, on the whole, were favorable to a high
level of residential building activity. It will unquestionably be felt more
acutely when circumstances are less favorable. Under such circum-
stances any diminution of aids would be considered widely to be a
calamity, and complete withdrawal would be held to spell disaster—
regardless of what the real as distinguished from the anticipated impact
of withdrawal may be.
In conclusion, war and postwar dislocations unquestionably ac-
celerated the scope of government activities in this field, but it would
seem more reasonable to anticipate that the federal government will
take a continued and growing role than to expect a diminution or
withdrawal of aids in the long run. This "trend" will not necessarily
apply to the FHA mortgage insurance system or the VA home loan
guarantee program as they now stand. In fact, there seem to be narrow
limits to the intensification of these aids in the future, and the trend
toward a greater role of the federal government in residential con-
struction and its financing may express itself in the use of new financial
devices.
Limits to Present Types of Aids
If the assumption of a "trend" is warranted, what are the limits
to the use of the present types of aids, and what are the probable
alternatives?
8 Public Law 94, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., June 30, 1953. As to the position taken
by home builders see Washington Letter, National Association of Home Builders,
Nos. 467, 468, and 469, June 11, 23, and 30, 1953.
See A Report to the President of the United States, President's Advisory Corn-
mittee on Government Housing Policies and Programs, December 1953. For the
proposed Housing Act of 1954 see S. 2938, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess.FUTURE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 291
This question is perhaps most pertinent if declining employment and
incomes are assumed. For it is in such a situation that the demands
for increased federal aids will become most pronounced. The record
of experience is not instructive on this point, since the federal programs
so far have operated on a broadly rising market.
Little is known about how the demand for new construction responds
to liberalization of credit terms during the downward phase of a
business cycle. How much would the demand for new housing be
stimulated if, under conditions of falling incomes, terms under a gov-
ernment mortgage insurance program were changed from, say, a 10
per cent minimum downpayment to zero downpayment, a 25-year
maximum maturity to 35 years, and 4 per cent interest to 33i per cent?
Arithmetically, this change would produce a monthly mortgage carry-
ing charge (level-payment) of $4.13 per $1,000 of purchase price of a
single-family house, as against $4.75 before. The reduction in loan
payments would be 13 per cent, but the decline in total monthly out-
lays for housing would be much less, perhaps only 6 to 8 per cent; for
real estate taxes, maintenance, heating, and other operational expenses
would not be affected by the decline in mortgage payments. The com-
plete elimination of downpayment may be a stimulating factor when
consumers as well as business firms prefer liquidity. But, even without
downpayment, cash outlays of several hundred dollars would still be
required for closing costs, additional landscaping, and other incidental
expenses usually associated with house purchase; and uncertainty
would still discourage the undertaking of fixed commitments.
The extension of maturities will have rapidly diminishing effects on
mortgage carrying charges compared with the effects of past actions in
this direction. The amount by which monthly level payments are
reduced when the maturity of a 4 per cent loan is extended from thirty
to forty years is $59 per $1,000 of loan, as against $1.29 for an extension
from twenty to thirty years. The percentage reduction is a little over
12 per cent compared with 21 per cent.1° More effective than an
extension of maturities is a change from full to partial amortization
of mortgage loans. If, say, only half the principal amount of loans
were to be repaid in periodic installments, the monthly debt charge
would be reduced substantially. But such a change would involve
suspending, if not abandoning, the principle of full amortization, one
10Cf.Ernest M. Fisher, Urban Real Estate Markets: Characteristics and Financ-
ing, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1951, pp. 71-72. For a general discus-
sion of the effects of changes of loan terms in installment financing see also Avram
Kisselgoff, Factors Affecting the Demand for Consumer instalment Sales Credit,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Technical Paper 7, 1952.292 FUTUBEROLEOF GOVERNMENT
of the outstanding improvements of the mortgage structure during the
past twenty years.
Moreover, in a falling market the large supply of existing housing
at declining prices or rents, often in the nature of distress sales or
rentals, would limit the volume of new housing that could be marketed
even at greatly liberalized credit terms. An annual production of 1 mil-
lion dwelling units, for example, equals little more than 2 per cent of
the number of existing nonfarm dwelling units—about 42 million in
1952. If only one-tenth of the existing supply were offered at distress
prices or rents, the quantity of old dwelling units coming on the market
would be four times as large as the volume of new construction—a com-
peting supply which would reduce the marketability of new housing
even though the latter might be more attractive in respect to both
physical characteristics and liberality of debt financing.
Under unfavorable business conditions, limits would also exist to the
stimulation of mortgage lending by private institutions. Whether
mortgage insurance would induce lenders to continue the financing
of new construction in the face of rising vacancies, defaults, and fore-
closures is an open question. Investments in insured or guaranteed
mortgages might be encouraged if the government covered more or all
of the risks still left with the mortgagee (such as the excess of fore-
closure costs over the maximum covered by the FHA and liberalization
of the "waste provisions" under which the mortgagee bears the risk of
unusual damage to property after institution of foreclosure proceed-
ings), or if the interest rate and terms of FHA debentures exchanged
for foreclosed properties were made more attractive.11 In the case of
VA loans the maximum amounts and percentages of the guarantee
could again be raised. The government might be reluctant, however,
to weaken the lenders' responsibility so much as to encourage the
misuse of credit. In any event, the effectiveness of these inducements
must be weighed against the conditions that would create reluctance in
lending on new construction. The insurance of bank deposits and of
accounts in savings and loan associations may serve at least to relieve
pressures that would otherwise accentuate the liquidity preference of
some types of financial institutions.
The greatest leeway for intensification of present programs exists
perhaps in the stimulation of alteration and modernization of existing
dwellings under Title I of the National Housing Act. The financial
charges for insured loans under this program are still fairly high—for
single-family houses, $5 discount for $100 face amount of loan per year
11Foran instructive discussion of these points see Mortgage Financing, Hearings
before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess.,
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for a term of three years and thirty-two days, including insurance
premium, which equals an effective interest charge of over 9 per cent.
A downward revision in periods of recession, combined with longer
maturities, would probably raise the demand for these loans fairly
rapidly.12
If there are narrow limits to the effectiveness of more intensive use
of mortgage insurance programs under conditions of business contrac-
tion, demands for "stronger medicine" will undoubtedly develop. The
direction of any attempts to meet them can be inferred from scattered
examples already on the record. Among these is the direct home loan
program of the Veterans' Administration, now of small magnitude and
on legal maximum terms identical with those of private mortgage
lenders making VA loans. Another is the Connecticut postwar program
under which the State Housing Authority granted direct mortgage
loans at 13 per cent interest with a maximum maturity of twenty-five to
thirty years. These loans are serviced by mortgage lending institutions
at the usual fee of .5 per cent. The state funds are obtained by short-
term borrowing.'3 A third example is the New York City program of
rental housing without cash subsidies, designed for income groups
above the admission limits for public housing with cash subsidies. In
this case, rentals are set to meet a debt charge based on low-cost, tax-
exempt public financing, as well as operating costs and partial exemp-
tion of real estate tax. Various schemes along similar lines have been
enacted in other states. Finally, as was pointed out before, the Federal
National Mortgage Association provides an instrument that can be
used for primary lending on nonmarket terms even though private
lending institutions may originate and service the loans. The Housing
Act of 1954 restricted the use of the FNMA as a primary source of
mortgage funds while continuing its authority to assist special housing
programs (such as the program for FHA insurance of mortgages in
cooperative housing) through the issuance of loan purchase commit-
ments. In a period of serious economic contraction, however, there
will be renewed pressure for employing the FNMA as a vehicle for
what amounts to public financing of housing construction.
If these observations are correct, the boundaries between "private"
and "public" residential construction will become less determinate. To
date the term "public housing" has been reserved broadly for the pro-
grams under which public capital funds or subsidies are made available
12 The President's Housing Message of January 25, 1954, and the proposed
Housing Act of 1954 (S. 2938) include an extension of the maximum term to five
years for single-family houses and a larger maximum amount of loan under Title I.
13 Chester llowles, "The Rote of the States," in Nathan Straus, Two Thirds of a
Nation, pp. 236 if. See also Housing Act of 1954, Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, Part I, pp. 383-386.294 FUTURE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
for projects owned and managed by public agencies. The record of
European housing since World War I is replete with arrangements
under which the distinction between private and public housing is
difficult if not impossible to maintain. It is at least conceivable that
forces at work in this country point in the same direction.
Consequences for Capital Formation and Financing
On the whole, past and projected federal policies in this field may be
interpreted as efforts to raise permanently the proportion of total
resources devoted to housing construction above the level that would
be obtained from the interplay of market forces. To the extent that the
efforts succeed, new residential construction will be maintained at a
higher volume than would be possible without existing and prospective
government aids.
Enough has been said about the uncertainties of consumers' reactions
to more liberal credit terms to indicate that the quantitative effects are
unpredictable. It is possible, however, to sketch some of the problems
and consequences of governmental efforts to raise the level of resi-
dential construction.
One of the problems concerns the interaction between new con-
struction and the market for existing residential facilities. A high
volume of new construction offered at advantageous financial terms
might aggravate declines in occupancy and in the price of old housing.
The federal government itself, however, has a great stake in the resi-
dential mortgage debt on existing property, represented at the end of
1953 by the contingent liabilities involved in $32 billion of outstanding
FHA and VA loans.' The government therefore has a substantial fiscal
interest in avoiding any decline in prices that may directly or indirectly
affect its contingent liabilities. Because the markets for new and old
housing are closely interconnected, any drastic revision of financing
terms in favor of new construction might involve corresponding changes
for loans on existing residential real estate,15 and possibly a transfer
of insured or guaranteed loans from private to public holdings.
There is a question as to the effect of continued or strengthened
government support on the productive efficiency of the house-building
industry. The implied assurance of output may tend to slow techno-
logical change or improved production processes and may thus retard
14Thisamount is the total of such loans outstanding. In the case of VA-
guaranteed loans, the guarantee itself covers only a portion of the principal,
averaging roughly 50 per cent of the total amount of such loans. 'Existinghouses originally built under FHA inspection are already eligible for
loans on terms equal to those for the financing of new constriiction under the FHA.
The proposed Housing Act of 1954 (S. 2938), if adopted, would establish more
nearly equal maximum terms for FHA loans on new and on existing houses.FUTtJRE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 295
progresstoward lower-priced or better products. It has been alleged,
for example, that the government support received by the British
house-building industry over the past thirty years has operated in this
direction.6 The record in this country, however, is none too clear and
has never been adequately analyzed. To the extent that the FHA
insurance program has accelerated the development of large-scale
operative builders, it has tended to raise efficiency. Moreover, the
industry was not noted for advances in efficiency during the period
before federal aids when fluctuations in output were extreme, and
implied assurance of more stable production may foster rather than
retard progress. Such an assurance wili be more effective if the past
practice of short-term and last-minute changes in housing legislation
is modified. This practice has sometimes created uncertainties no less
aggravating to builders and mortgage lenders than the uncertainties
of market forces.
Finally, a trend toward a larger role of the federal government in the
financing of residential construction would loosen if not break the
nexus between the savings process and investment in new residential
real estate. Historically, the flow of funds into housing construction
has been determined by the economic forces affecting the volume of
savings and the alternative attractions of different types of investment;
that is, new residential construction has competed with all other
potential uses for savings. While insurance or guarantee has influenced
the attractiveness of residential mortgages relative to other investment
outlets,direct government lending (already foreshadowed in the
operations of the Federal National Mortgage Association) would tend
to divorce the level of investment in new housing more clearly from
the competition of other potential uses for savings. The federal govern-
ment may have to borrow money and may have to accommodate itself
to changing conditions in the market for capital funds. But it has means
of influencing that market which are beyond the power of private
financial institutions. The restraints on federal financing for housing
or any other purposes are less direct than those which operate on
private financial institutions, and the choice of the use of federal funds
for alternative investments is a matter of public decision rather than of
relative attractiveness of investment outlets.
In conclusion, it appears that the level of residential construction
during the next few decades will continue to depend on political
decisions as well as on the market-oriented decisions which were con-
trolling before the thirties, and that the impact of political decisions
°ProductivityTeam Report: Building, Anglo-American Council on Productivity,
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may be even greater than it has been from the mid-thirties to date.
Government interest and activity in this field will attempt to maintain
a high volume of capital formation in residential construction. The test
of the effectiveness of such a policy under adverse conditions is yet to
come. In any event, the effort will most likely involve major changes
in the institutional arrangements for allocating funds to new building
activity. Under the FHA and VA programs the government to date has
sought to meet its objectives by incentive and persuasion in association
with its assumption of risks. In this framework many of the existing
institutional arrangements in the creation and ownership of residential
mortgage debt have been preserved. There is a real question whether
these arrangements will or can be maintained as the public demand
for new financial tools, such as direct lending by government, grows
in intensity.
Urban Redevelopment and Public Housing Programs
Capital investment in "urban redevelopment" looms large in most of
the projections of total capital requirements prepared in recent years.
It has a direct bearing on capital formation in residential construction,
for the estimates of potential expenditures for urban redevelopment
are based entirely on calculated replacement needs for residential
structures considered substandard, although renewal of the nation's
urban plant should by no means be limited to residential facilities. The
calculated replacement requirements are an important component of
the "housing need" estimates outlined in Chapter XVII.
The magnitudes involved may be illustrated by one example. Projec-
tions of America's capital requirements for 1951 to 1960 by the Twen-
tieth Century Fund include $26 billion in 1940 prices for replacement
of substandard dwellings. This amount exceeds by about one-third the
investment in residential construction projected to meet "new require-
ments," that is, those assigned to population increase and provision of
a normal vacancy reserve. It is almost as large as the projected outlays
for highways and is more than half the projected new investment in
mining and manufacturing facilities. It represents fully 10 per cent of
the nation's estimated aggregate capital requirements.'7 In terms of 'RobertW. Hartley et at., America's Capital Requirements, Twentieth Century
Fund, 1950. Housing data based on Table 31, P. 55; other data, on Table 16, p. 23.
The replacement estimate of $26 billion (in 1940 prices) for 1951-1960 includes
$18.7 billion for "accumulated deficiencies" and $7.4 billion for "current obsoles-
cence" of dwelling units. It assumes that (1) no nonfarm dwelling unit in 1960
would be more than sixty years old, (2) no nonf arm dwelling unit would need
repairs, and (3) no unit in urban areas would lack a private bath and flush toilet.
"New requirements" are composed of "nonnal expected increase in families, addi-
tional increase resulting from undotibling, and provision of vacancy allowance of
5 per cent of total supply."FUTURE ROLEOF GOVERNMENT 297
dwelling units, 6,705,000 units are scheduled in this projection for
replacement as against 5,300,000 calculated to meet "new requirements"
and normal demolition losses. Obviously, the volume of residential con-
struction during the next generation would differ a great deal depend-
ing upon whether or not replacement of this or similar magnitude can
reasonably be expected.
The purpose of projections such as these is to help in establishing
goals for the community at large—a purpose quite different from the
objective of this study, which is to examine the prospects for capital
formation and financing in residential construction in the light of
market forces observed in the past and of the probable role of govern-
ment activity in this field. Urban redevelopment is unquestionably one
of the new factors to be reckoned with in any appraisal of future
prospects for capital formation in residential construction. The prin-
ciple of federal and state aid for this purpose is already embodied in
law, although programs to date have been of small magnitude.18 But
several questions, usually bypassed in numerical projections of housing
replacement needs, must be raised before the impact of urban redevel-
opment objectives on future capital formation can be evaluated.
Will the community at large adopt urban redevelopment programs
in anything like the size implied in most of the projections? Will it be
willing to pay the price involved in federal and local aids, particularly
if the costs of executing redevelopment programs should be larger than
now contemplated? Is it desirable or feasible to concentrate urban
redevelopment, a remedy for the acts of many past generations, within
relatively short periods? Can the specific resources employed in such
a spectacular undertaking be used in construction after the redevelop-
ment program is completed and only "normal" demand and current
replacement requirements are to be met? Granted that, numerically,
demolition of a dwelling unit creates a "need" for a unit to be built,
what are the prospects for actually marketing replacement units in the
hoped-for quantities?
Only a few of these questions can be discussed here, but their con-
sideration, it is hoped, may also throw some light on the others. Brief
references to the mechanics of urban redevelopment will be necessary
for an understanding of more basic issues.
Urban redevelopment programs typically involve land acquisition
18TitleI of the Housing Act of 1949 provides for federal aid to local redevelop-
ment projects. The execution of the federal program was slowed by the Korean
war. By December 1953, sixty applications from twenty-nine localities had been
approved for loans and grants or for grants only. Approved loans totaled $104
million, of which about $31 million had been disbursed, and approved capital
grants were $105 million, of which about $9 million had been disbursed. Housing
Statistics, Housthg and Home Finance Agency, January 1954, p. 57.298 FUTUREROLE.OF GOVERNMENT
and removal of structures by local governments and a write-down of
the cost of the (cleared) land by local or a combination of federal and
local aid. Thus, to take a somewhat simplified example, under the
provisions of the Housing Act of 1949, if the cost of land acquisition
and clearance is $1,000,000 and the re-use value is $500,000, two-thirds
of the write-down may be borne by the federal government and one-
third by the city. The emphasis in the act is on "maximum opportunity
for the redevelopment of project areas by private enterprise" although
the land may alternatively be used for public housing projects by local
authorities.bo Private developments must, of course, be designed to
meet all operating costs and a return on capital. Residential redevelop-
ment by private enterprise is, therefore, contingent upon demand
expectations for new housing. Deferring discussion of the use of cleared
sites for public housing, two questions then become of crucial im-
portance for the volume of residential construction: the effects of large-
scale residential demolitions on the demand for new residential con-
struction generally; and the effects of lower land costs on rent levels
in new residential developments on cleared sites, which influence
specifically the demand for these developments.
It is illuminating to examine the "demolition" effects and the "write-
down" effects separately. The demolition effects can be seen most
clearly if it is assumed that the cleared sites previously occupied by
residential buildings are used for nonresidential structures or for parks
or are left vacant. In this case the effects of demolition on new con-
struction will be indirect, and it is most unlikely that they will produce
a one-to-one relationship between the number of demolished and the
number of newly built dwelling units. The households dislocated by
demolition will focus their demand primarily on the existing supply,
for few occupants of substandard housing can afford new privately
financed facilities. Some of them will fill vacancies; the proportion of
those doing so will depend on the vacancy ratio, and the price and
rental distribution as well as the location of vacant dwelling units.
Others will bid for occupied units. Still others will double up with
existing households—particularly the fairly large number of "broken
families" characteristic of occupants of slums and blighted areas. With
the filling up of vacancies and the bidding for occupied units, rents and
prices will rise and forces leading to new construction will be set in
motion.
Thus there would be attritions at many points in the chain of market
processes from demolition to new construction. Attritions would be
especially great if a large portion of the demolished residential areas
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had been occupied by Negroes and other minority groups severely
restricted in their choice of residential location. As a result, demolitions
would most probably result in new construction of a smaller number
of dwelling units than the number of demolished units. Using the
previously mentioned projection of the Twentieth Century Fund as an
illustration, the demolition of 6.7 million units from 1951 through 1960,
equal to more than 17 per cent of the total number of nonf arm units
existing at the beginning of the period,20 might generate new con-
struction of only 5 million units.
The effects of the write-down of land costs for redevelopment projects
can be seen most clearly if it is assumed that the sites to be cleared are
wholly occupied by nonresidential structures and are to be improved
exclusively with residential developments. Cranting that housing de-
mand is responsive to price (but less so than it is to income), the write-
down of land costs then becomes the only factor operating on demand.
While actual figures will vary from case to case, a 50 per cent write-
down of land costs will rarely produce a rent reduction of more than
10 per cent as compared with rentals for the same kind of housing
produced without benefit of the write-down of land costs.2' Rent
reduction of this magnitude will tend to widen the market for new
construction in only moderate degree, since elasticity of demand to
rent is probably low.22 The write-down of land costs of itself does not
produce rentals low enough to make occupancy of new housing pos-
sible for large numbers of households that otherwise could not afford
it. The tenants for private residential redevelopment projects must
come in large part from households that can afford new dwelling units
anywhere, in central or outlying areas.23 To the extent that redevelop-
20 According to the Census of Housing, there were 38 million nonfarm dwelling
units in April 1950, other than seasonally vacant units. Allowing for net additions
during the remainder of 1950, the probable number at the beginning of 1951
would have been about 39 million.
21 As a schematic example, it may be assumed that a redevelopment project
without government aid may involve an expenditure of $300,000 for cleared land
and $700,000 for improvements including architects' fees and carrying charges
during construction. A write-down of land costs by 50 per cent would reduce the
total investment from $1,000,000 to $850,000, or 15 per cent. However, operating
expenses of the new project would not be affected by the write-down of land
costs. Assuming an "operating ratio" of 40 per cent—i.e. an allocation of 40 per cent
of gross income to operating expenses, including taxes, and of 60 per cent to return
on investment—the reduction of gross rents made possible by the write-down
would be only three-fifths of 15 per cent, or 9 per cent.
22 If the Duesenberry-Kistin price eLasticity coefficient of 8 per cent is accepted
(Chapter VIII), a 10 per cent reduction in rent would raise demand by wholly
insignificant amounts.
23 This point is illustrated by the projected rents in redevelopment projects
proposed by New York City's Committee on Slum Clearance under TitleI
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ment projects attract households that otherwise would have moved
into new housing elsewhere, no net additions to the volume of new
construction can be expected, although redevelopment may stimulate
construction in central locations at the expense of outlying areas.24
Thus the "write-down" effects on demand are far more limited than
the "demolition" effects, and if they alone were controlling, the scope
of redevelopment would be reduced to the volume of new residential
construction that could be absorbed by the additional demand gen-
erated by lower land costs in residential redevelopment projects. This
volume would have little relation to the large numbers appearing in
projections of capital requirements for urban redevelopment.
Under the mechanics of present federal aids for redevelopment, there
will in fact be an admixture of "demolition" and "write-down" effects.
For the Housing Act of 1949 permits federal aids for the removal of
residential slums or blighted areas and preparation of such sites for any
redevelopment, residential or nonresidential; and for the removal of
nonresidential slums or blighted areas if the sites are to be redeveloped
for predominantly residential uses. The admixture of demolition and
write-down effects will depend on the relative quantities of residential
and nonresidential demolitions and land uses on the cleared sites and,
in the case of new residential projects on old residential sites, on
densities before and after clearance.
To the extent that sites are used for public housing projects, demand
limitations on the scope of urban redevelopment no longer apply. For
public housing, through operating subsidies, does make occupancy of
new housing possible for households which otherwise would be unable
to afford it. If public housing is to be accorded a larger position in
redevelopment programs, however, subsidies for an expanded public
housing program must be added to subsidies involved in land acquisi-
tion alone. This factor may again tend to limit the scope of redevelop-
ment programs. Regardless of the place of public housing in the
programs, the implications for private capital formation and financing
in residential construction are clear. Either because of a much larger
projects proposed during 1951-1952 ranges from $27 to $35. At an average of
33i rooms per apartment, the monthly rent per apartment would range from about
$95 to $122. A sample study of new rental housing projects completed in the
New York metropolitan area in various periods from 1949 to 1951 revealed average
apartment rentals of $107 to $115. More than four-fifths of the apartments in these
projects had 3 to 4% rooms (Kathryn R. Murphy, "New Rental Housing Charac-
teristics in Nine Areas," Monthly Labor Review, December 1951).
24 Some net additions to the volume of construction may result from provision
of new accommodations in redevelopment projects for minority groups whose
choice of outlying residential locations is severely limited even if they are able to
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admixture of public housing projects than is now visualized, or because
of the limited effects of demolition and write-down on the demand for
new private construction, the opportunities for private investment
would appear to be much smaller than numerical projections of capital
requirements for urban redevelopment suggest.
None of these observations detracts from the desirability of urban
redevelopment or the removal of slums as a goal. The growth of a
nation's capital equipment has no other purpose, except in wartime,
than to produce a higher level of living. The persistence of slums
is indeed a blot on the nation's record in meeting this objective. But
there seems to be a need for much more thorough consideration of
the means and costs of accomplishing slum clearance and of the con-
sequences entailed in its realization. The usefulness of projections of
capital requirements for urban redevelopment is greatly impaired if
such consideration is lacking. To date, redevelopment programs have
been so small that their relationship to demand could be ignored. If
they are projected on a massive scale, however, it can no longer be
assumed that capital requirements based on the need for replacing
each demolished unit by a new unit will be translated into actual
capital formation.
As was said before, public housing provides the operational means
for enabling those otherwise unable to do so to occupy new housing.
Public low rent housing programs, whether or not combined with slum
clearance, will therefore raise the level of total residential construc-
tion, except to the extent that public housing in the future may compete
for occupants with new privately financed construction and therefore
reduce the volume of private construction. Whether or not such com-
petition will occur is wholly conjectural, for it depends on statutory
and administrative provisions as well as the volume of public housing.
Under the federal peacetime programs to date, income limits for public
housing occupants have been set so as to exclude income groups likely
to seek new housing accommodations offered at full cost. The pos-
sibility of competition with new private construction has therefore
been held to a minimum.25 Pressures for an upward extension of
income limits, however, are strong, for there always are income groups
between those eligible for public housing and those able to afford new
25 In addition to establishing criteria for income limits, Title Ill of the Housing
Act of 1949 provides that no federal aid be extended unless the local public
agency has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the federal authority "that a gap
of at least 20 per centum has been left between the upper rental limits for admis-
sion to the proposed low-rent project and the lowest rents at which private enter-
prise unajded by public subsidy is providing (through new construction and
available existing structures) a substantial supply of decent, safe, and sanitary
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privately financed construction in any substantial volume, which
appear to be left unserved. Whatever the merits of a position that
assumes the desirability of a nearly proportional distribution of new
housing construction over all income groups, it cannot be denied that
it is gaining increasing public acceptance and is, in fact, one of the
mainstays of programmatic housing literature with widespread in-
fiuence.26 These pressures for extending the income limits for public
housing are already apparent in New York City's non-cash-subsidy
projects, referred to earlier,2t and, if successful on a large scale,
might alter future opportunities for investment in private residential
construction.
26 See Lasch, op. cit.; Abrams, op. cit.; and Straus, op. cit.
27 Families earning up to $4,900 a year are admitted to these projects. Although
no cash subsidies are involved, the projects have tax benefits inasmuch as their
real estate tax is based on the predevelopment assessed valuation of the parcel.
Also, tax-exempt public financing is involved.